

# STATE, POWER AND HEGEMONY

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## **Abstract:**

In various eras of history either a unique hegemony has shaped the security environment in line with the events engendered by its projection of power or a number of similar power centers has appeared, and the competition and rivalry among them have determined the direction of historical developments. At times a single hegemonic power was able to maintain its dominance in spite of many rivals and at other times new emerging powers set the new world order by ending the rule of the former hegemonic power. In order to prevent the emergence of more powerful rivals, a hegemonic power normally has chosen the policy of 'divide and rule' until the rivals disappear.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the conditions of being a global or regional power have changed and strategic and political factors such as controlling global money circulation, determining the international agenda, deployment of military power in key regions, and being the centre of attraction have become absolutely necessary. In this context, the actor that ensures these conditions more than others and that has more coercive power and attraction to exercise on others will be able to declare its regional hegemony and will become a global center of power if it can spread its influence globally. This article aims to disclose the essential conditions for nation-states to maintain their existence and to secure their interests in the new world order. It also seeks to examine the ways in which nation states can handle and overcome the threats posed by hegemonic powers. To do this, we have to begin by explicating the evolution of hegemony and power relations within the historical context beginning from theoretical origins.

**Key Words: State, Hegemony, Power, Realism, Security.**

## **INTRODUCTION**

The first quarter of the 21<sup>st</sup> century marks a period of developing parameters which will bring about crucial changes in the realm of international relations and security throughout the century. The global security environment is profoundly complicated due to the atmosphere of general chaos and instability. As the scope of foreign interventions and international power competition changes, collective regulating powers of the world weaken considerably. These years will in the future be seen as representing the beginning of a period by the end of which many nation-states will be demolished. The post-cold war period is fundamentally marked by aspects of the unipolar security environment following the disintegration of the Soviet Union as well as the phenomena of globalization that has accelerated due to developments in information and communication technologies. We may add to these the developments related to the European Union which is itself the product of post-modern paradigm and which, as a supranational entity, challenges the structure, identity and sovereignty of nation-states.

Since the 1990s, the nation-state itself has been in search of a place in the balance of power among the global and regional initiatives shaped by the unipolar hegemonic order, while on the other hand it has struggled to overcome the erosion of its structure caused by globalization and post-modern ideas. As nation states are in the process of adapting themselves to the new security environment, they are in need of determining new roles and structural reforms internally and externally to the disadvantage of the traditional nation state. In this process of transformation, it has become academically important to examine issues

pertaining to the protection of national sovereignty, national identity and national interests as well as to articulate new security concepts and power projection that will enable the nation-state to achieve these aims. In this sense, we will first present a framework concerning hegemony and power systematic starting with the theoretical basis and then move to the realm of practice. Finally, we will introduce some solutions in relation to the needs of nation-states in the 21<sup>st</sup> century within the existing parameters of hegemony and power.

## CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF POWER AND HEGEMONY

### Evolution of Realism:

Theories of international relations comprise an exclusive source to improve our understanding of power relations and security policies. These theories in general try to explain international relations with three key concepts; power, structure, and hegemony. Till today, the dominant approach in the field of international relations has been Realism, a paradigm rooted in positivism, in spite of other theories (like Liberalism, Marxism, Constructionism, and other post-isms) competing with it (Baylis, Smith: 2005, 5). To Realists, the basis of international relations is the *power struggle* among nations which try to maximize their interests. This mechanism presents a structure that is based on military power and cooperation and that aims to turn the *power balance* to its advantage in the process of making the world order.

According to the Realist approach, power balance and related policies are necessary for states in pursuit of more power to maintain or dismantle the status quo (Ari, 1997: 256). To the present day, Realism has been a paradigm primarily shaped by the needs, views, and interests of America, the main actor of world policy. However, in recent years, the dominance of Realism has been challenged by three global developments (Baylis, Smith: 2005, 273); *(1) Neo-liberal institutions are becoming increasingly important. (2) Globalisation has introduced new dimensions of world policy. (3) Developments in social sciences and philosophy undermined positivist assumptions and demolished the basic assumptions of Realism.*

With the end of Cold War, the United States, the frontier of theoretical studies, began to search for a new vision in order to form a new conceptual basis based on the Realism to bolster its hegemonic dominance. Firstly, President (Father) George H.W. Bush defined the concept of the '**new world order**', but the concept disappeared in a short time due to its unfilled content. Clinton envisaged '**globalisation**' as the propulsive element maintaining peace and security in the world through increased political relations and economical ties in particular. With the Neo-Cons, Son Bush more interested in furthering American interests, determined the basic principles of his strategy following Sep 11 attacks as '**hegemony in war with terror**' (Barry, 2004: 1); *unending war against international terror, preventive intervention, aggressive unilateralism, and protection of American military dominance.*

For the time being, the dominant paradigm in American strategy is called '**democratic realism**' (Progressive Policy Institute, 2003). The phenomena of '**interdependency**' related to '**globalisation**' and postmodern paradigms, has become more evident toward to the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century, and has brought about a

new international system that affects the actors and methods of American hegemony presented by Realism. Thus, in order to understand the security environment in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is necessary to examine the influence of globalisation and post-modernism over the security and power relations.

### **Globalisation and Power Relations:**

In the aftermath the end of the Cold war in 1989, the world has entered into a rapid period of change accelerated by the fact of globalisation. Some scholars consider globalisation as the world wide expansion of some economic systems, social and cultural norms. While talking about globalisation, Clinton used to put the stress on its historical inevitability, its social necessity, and the need for America to lead this process. Globalisation filled up a conceptual vacuum enhanced America's status as the unique superpower of the world and hence became a natural doctrine of global hegemony (Brzezinski, 2004: 178).

Globalisation is evaluated as a progressive process since it weakens homogeneous structures. In this sense, terms such as mosaic, hybridization, and articulation are deployed to define the process of globalisation (Şen, 2004: 197). With globalisation, we witness the rise of 'the conscious of being an individual'; individuals are pushed to organize within sub-identities or organs like 'ethnic and cultural rights' or 'environmentalism' etc. The resurgence of political religion brings with it the exploitation of holy emotions. Putting democracy and democratic rights on the national agendas bring up new political questions such as minority rights, the right of various identities to express themselves, and protection of their cultures in related countries.

The most important fact of globalisation is its ability to influence nations and communities. Those nations that are subject to these influences or unable to keep in step with globalisation develop a defensive reflex against globalisation and its values with feelings of fragility and oversensitivity (Moralı, 2003: 1-5). As a matter of fact, not many nations neither have the power nor the position and capability to manipulate the possibilities introduced by globalisation. Actors that benefit from globalization, such as industrialized countries, multinational corporations, and other powerful actors, utilize the things, resources and their powers as much as possible in influencing economic activities in order to protect their political and economic interests. Sometimes they even ignore economical communities they established and the legal aspects of those communities; and capture the local dynamics in the targeted nations and the possibilities vital for the nation-states in order to maintain their sovereignty and identity.

Globalisation presents three new actors into international arena; (Drezner, 2004: 271-272); global capital markets, international organisations, and a global civilian community. Boundaries of states appear to slow down the integration pressed by the globalisation. Globalisation indirectly destroys the structure of developing states (Kazgan, 2000). Most of the national and international institutions willing to fall in step with globalisation are in the process of 'changing their shells'. Since globalisation stands out with its capacity to deform and ignore the security of the nation-state, the security concept of the nation-state in the 21<sup>st</sup> century should be reconsidered (IDSS: 2006, 15).

### **Post-Modernism and National Power:**

In the last 25 years, post-modernism triggered effective theoretical studies in social sciences beginning from the mid 1980s. The post-modern paradigm firstly objected to the 'sovereign modern' as a conceptual term in international relations. Post-modern thinking sees society as the intersection of many internal powers by questioning the state-centered model (Keyman, 2000: 101). The state is envisaged as a dependent variable within the structure of civil society. Post-modernists claim that the state is not a rational entity, out of problematic but an arbitrary relationship which would never go in order in the system but is forced to be in order with intensive formation and discipline. To the Postmodernists, sovereignty or the (modern) state is far from being a solution (Cochran, 1995: 240).

Post-modernists try to overcome the problem of the internal sovereignty of the nation state with the term of '**governance**'. The concept of governance is structured at the global level with the 'Global Compact' declared by the UN in Malmo in 2000. That structure consists of three equal partners (Gaudin, 2005: 22); **state, private sector, and civilian society organisations**. As the government only keeps 'bureaucratic structure' inside, governance contains civilian society institutions and non-governmental organisations to the disadvantage of the nation-state. Thus the neo-liberal thinking gains a method to intervene into government area with the governance model. No longer the nation-state is a 'governing' force, it is in a status that the forms of governance is proposed, legitimated, and controlled. (Hirst, Thompson, 2000: 225).

According to Post-modernists, the modern state has been a popular form of state for more than hundred years, and contains nationalism as a propulsive force, sometimes aggressive by keeping violation element, and it is insistent on its sovereignty over law and rule. Post-modernism limits the space of the sovereign state, citing the roles of actors out of state in international relations. The post-modern state is ready to redefine sovereignty as a legitimate right and accept mutual intervention into domestic affairs. The European Union (EU) is the first degree example of the post-modern society (Cooper, 2005: 179). Membership and neighbourhood relations of the European Union require undermining the values such as nation-state, nationalism, sovereignty, boundaries of modern order. However, this does not apply to the frontier countries of the EU; Germany, France, and England in practice. As a matter of fact, that kind of security understanding will have no meaning other than leaving the reins to the EU frontier countries in pursuit of hegemonic power around their own peripheries.

### **Roots of Hegemony:**

The term hegemony originating from ancient Greek 'hegemonia' literally expresses the dominant and oppressive status of one element in the system over the others. The concept of hegemony greatly contributes to a better understanding of current international relations and power relations. Antonio Gramsci has significantly contributed to the articulation of this concept suggesting that power is not only dependent on force but also on 'consent'. According to Gramsci, hegemony represents the status of the most powerful country in the international system or the position of a dominant state in a specific region. For Gramsci hegemony entails 'cooperation ensured by force', combining social and political supervision, force and consent (Barrett, 1997: 239).

Gramsci's thoughts guided many scholars, who came after him. The hegemony of Gramsci used to advocate hidden or appropriated hegemony at the back side. A follower of Gramsci, the Canadian scholar Robert W. Cox utilized Gramsci's study to criticize other theories of international relations. According to Cox, theories like Realism and Neo-realism were coined to preserve the status quo serving the interests of rich dominant Western countries and their elite (Cox, 1981: 16-155). Those theories aimed to make the international order seem natural and unchangeable. Hegemony enabled the dominant state to spread its moral, political, and cultural values around the society and sub-communities. This was done through civilian society institutions. Civilian society consists of the net of institutions and practices that are partly autonomous from the state. Hegemony is to produce social and political systems that are to be applied on the nations targeted.

There are many ideas about the relationship between hegemony and imperialism. Imperialism is defined as enlarging the dominance of one nation over the other by way of open political and economical instruments (Heywood, 2007: 392). To explain the basic difference between the imperialism and hegemony Keohane says that as hegemony manipulates the relations with no superior body, imperial powers set their superiority with a senior political body (Keahone, 1991: 435-439). However imperialists have an approach for expansion by conquering new territory. Another scholar, Duncan Snidal separates hegemony into three; hegemony implied by conviction, kind but forceful hegemony, and colonialist hegemony based on force (Snidal, 1986: 579-614).

Discrimination between hegemony and dominance is another study subject argued by many scholars including Machiavelli, Gramsci, and Nye. According to those three intellectuals, a major power should not just rely on dominance, force, and hard power. Machiavelli advocates 'respect' as a source of obedience to a major power (Wright, 2004). Gramsci says that a major power itself evokes willingness and cooperation instinctively (Cox, 1993: 49-66). Nye believes that a superior power becomes a hegemonic power by persuading others to cooperate. Persuasion would be ensured by the utilization of soft power that makes other countries believe in common interests (Nye, 2002). However, according to hegemonic stability theory, major powers achieve their position unilaterally with the deployment of hard power but retaining consent and conviction (Keahone, 1984: 11).

In another definition, hegemony is the position of having the capability and power to change the rules and norms of international systems based on one's own motivation and desire (Volgy, 2005: 1-2). If you don't have enough power to affect global events in line with your own road map, that would be a dangerous illusion. Susan Strange envisages that hegemony requires two kinds of strength; relational, and structural based (Strange, 1989: 165). Relation based power is the strength to persuade and force the other actors one by one or in groups. Structural power is the essential capacity to realize the desired rules, norms, and operations in the international system. A hegemon creates or maintains critical regimes to cooperate in the future, and reduces uncertainty while other states are in pursuit of their own interests.

### Sources of Hegemony:

Traditionally, one used to evaluate the war capacity of a nation in order to understand its power status. But sources of power have changed drastically in parallel with technological innovations over the centuries. Population was a great source of power in Europe's agricultural economies in the 17<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries because people were needed as taxpayers and as soldiers for land armies that comprised mainly mercenary soldiers. For this reason, France was in a dominant position in that period. However with the increasing importance of industrialization in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, England became dominant in the seas with a unique fleet and then Germany became superior thanks to the help of railroads (Nye, 2003: 5-7). In the middle of 20<sup>th</sup> century, the United States and the Soviet Union gained superior power status, each with the following factors; uncounterable military capability, especially their nuclear arsenal, in addition to their industrial superiority and ideologocial framework.

As proposed in the Critical Theory presented by the Frankfurt School, there are three dimensions of power (Gill& Law, 1988: 73-74);

- 'Open power'; active power, openly applied to affect the attitude of another state in a desired way.

- 'Covert power'; more passive but organized, utilized in a vaguely way in order to make agenda of powerful side. Covert power is practiced by limiting political lines and leaving some issues out of an agenda.

- 'Structural power'; definite attraction and limitation systems with the physical and normative aspects to shape the relations of parties.

There has been general determinations in relation to the features of hegemon power such as; effective cuurrency unit in the international arena, a great military posture with the alliances and bases in every part of the world, leadership in regional crisis and conflicts, retaining nuclear arms, persuasion capacity over the other nations, legitimation of status by spreading own life standard and values culturally around the world (Uzgel, 2003: 31). Brzezinski claims that the troika of a hegemon are money, production capacity, and military power (Brzezinski, 2004: 87). Susan Strange stresses that America ensures its hegemonic capacity through its own structural power enabled by security, production, finance, and knowledge capacity in international economy-politics exceeding regional dimensions (Strange, 1987: 565).

Furthermore Strange claims that structural power is dependent on four elements (Strange, 1987: 565). In international political economy, the nation which has those elements more than the others is the most powerful; (1) *Maintaining the capability to influence the other states through threats, defense, denial or escalation of violence.* (2) *Keeping in hand the control of goods and service production systems.* (3) *Holding the authority of determination and management possibilites in finance and credit institutions.* (4) *Retaining the most effective instruments to influence the knowledge and informatics either technically or religiously through acquiring, production, and communication.*

The originator of term 'soft power' Joseph S. Nye lists the sources of hegemonic power as following (Nye, 2003: 30); (1) *Technological leadership,* (2)

*Supremacy in military and economy, (3) Soft power, (4) Control of the connection points of international communication lines. According to Nye, nations should develop these capacities in order to have soft power in the information age (Nye, 2003: 30); (1) Cultures and ideas that are close to global norms (like liberalism, pluralism, autonomy). (2) Global communication channels influence agendas. (3) Global prestige with own domestic and international performance.*

## **POWER RELATIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY**

### **New Security Environment:**

The prevalent optimism and positive security environment at the beginning of the Post-Cold war period have lasted a very short time. Old security problems have arisen with global effects through emerging regional hegemonic aspirations, ethnic and nationalist movements in countries such as Iraq and the Former Yugoslavia. The general security agenda is greatly occupied with transnational threats like proliferation of nuclear arms and international terrorism. The first years of the globalisation period were marked with new types of conflicts with ethnic, religious, and tribal characteristics not seen in the Cold War period. In parallel with them, new forms of threat posed by new actors that were hitherto undermined or ignored by the states which had security structures fundamentally based on the traditional, state centered military threats. The priority issues of international security in the period of globalisation have predominantly been terrorism and organised crime executed by non-state groups but supported by some states in pursuit of their national interests (MG Akademisi, 2004: 38-39).

**Table 1: Transformation of Security Environment**

<b>Cold War</b>	<b>Today</b>
* <b>State centered international order</b>	* <b>Globalisation / Transnational actors</b>
* <b>Bipolarity</b>	* <b>Unipolarity, asymmetric power distribution</b>
* <b>National security focused</b>	* <b>National interest focused</b>
* <b>National defense</b>	* <b>Wide spectrum of security</b>
* <b>Deterrence and defence</b>	* <b>Expanding scope of conflicts</b>
* <b>Specific sources of conflicts</b>	* <b>Indefinite sources of conflicts in general</b>

*Source: Peter R. FABER: NATO's Military Transformation Past, Present, Future, NATO Defence College Occasional Paper: After Istanbul, (Rome, 2004), 33.*

The reconstruction process of the Post-Cold War period is still in progress. The trend is toward to a multipolar world system and the international environment is becoming more chaotic. Reasons behind this trend may be listed as the following (Öztürk, 2007: 30); (1) Noninfluential and inadequate supervising and regulating powers, (2) Transformation of strategic resources like water, oil, and natural gas have become political and security issues as the environmental issues like global warming make other agenda matters with the disaster risks. (3) Energy competition will clarify the winners of the super and major power race. (4) Ethnic and religious issues are getting more exploited within the concepts of democracy, human rights, and the war on terror. (5) Globalisation feeds the imbalance among the regions and nations.

The fundamental difficulty of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is a lack of an institutional framework to accommodate with the scope, scale, and nature of the modern global problems. Four main types of institutional deficiency listed below reveal the need for reform in the international order (Bradford, 2005: 5-6);

- Ongoing Post-Second WW balance in UN Security Council. (As some countries demand equality, some countries like Germany, Japan, and other developed countries request privileged status in representation).

- Lasting desires to change the veto ratio in the Bretton Woods' institutions (WB, IMF) since the Seattle meetings in 1999.

- US unilateral tendency to utilize its military, economic, media, and political power in its implementation of foreign policy.

- Requirement for the specialist agencies to overcome the contemporary problems unveiled by the interdependency.

Buzan claims that three theoretical perspectives are predominant in explaining the Post-Cold War security environment; neo-realist, globalist, and regionalist (Buzan, Waever, 2003: 13). The neo-realist approach suggests that the international order is still state-centered and power distribution is stuck between unipolarity and multipolarity. Combining the cultural, transnational, and international economic-political approaches as the antithesis of neo-realism, globalists focus on the structural role of non-governmental actors (corporations, NGOs, intergovernmental organisations, and civilian society organisations) in the system and express that those actors control capital, technology, information, and organisations, as the state is a player of that global net. Regionalists advocate that arising regional issues with the disappearance of bipolarity and the weak powers in the asymmetric power system shift the priority to domestic matters and near periphery in foreign policy.

The Sept 11 attacks in 2001 was a crucial event affecting future formations of nations for the history of power policies. While terror emerges as a power utilization method of the weak in asymmetrical power balance, it also militarizes American foreign policy. From the perspective of international relations keeping conflicts and security concerns in its nucleus, it is the fact that terror continually existed but spread with the waves of Sep 11 causing paranoias fed by conspiracy theories. Fragmentation, uncertainty, doubt, and fear have started to dominate this new system.

In sum, global security dilemmas in the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are more diverse in comparison to those of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The traditional tie between the national sovereignty and the nation security has weakened. War is no longer a formally declared state problem as it once was. The rare wars generally waged by developed countries against underdeveloped countries will be fought with sensitive arms for the control and disarmament of the rival. In the age of globalisation, war is usually performed in the form of unofficial, prevalent, and unnamed conflicts with special and proxy wars, covert operations, and propaganda struggles based on a global intelligence network.

### **Global Power Balance:**



Realist thought suggests that a situation called as power balance and relevant policies accordance with it necessarily emerges due to the states willing to gain power in order to maintain or revise the existing status quo (Ari, 1997: 256). The power balance is achieved by lightening the heavy side or supporting the weak side. In various eras of history either a unique hegemony shaped the security environment in line with the events engendered by its power projection or a couple of similar power centers appeared and their competition and struggle between them directed the way of historical developments. In order to avoid more powerful rivals, a hegemonic power normally opted for the policy of divide and rule till the competitors disappeared. However throughout history, many rapidly rising power centers ended the supremacy of the hegemonic power and established a new world order in which they were at the center.

**Table 2: Hegemony and Power Balance Since the 19 th Century**


Periods	Superpowers	Major Powers
19 th Century	England (H), France, Russia	Japan, Germany, USA
Post I st WW	England (H), USA, USSR	Japan, Germany, France
Cold War	USA (H), USSR	Japan, Germany, China
Post Cold War	USA (H)	China, Japan, Russia, EU (Germ.-Eng.-Fr.)

*Source: Table prepared in accordance with the data provided by Çetin ÖNGÜN (An Historical Approach to US Power; Amerikan Gücüne Tarihsel Bir Yaklaşım, 2007) and Barry BUZAN, Ole WAEVER (Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security, 2003).*

Buzan’s classification from top to bottom as super, major, and regional power already represents a valid approach for determining power status. Buzan depicts the super power as a status of active player in the international security environment with first degree military-political capabilities and a robust economy supporting them. A super power may constitute a position of threat, guarantor, ally or intervener in each region as it desires. In addition to those features, it possesses universal values to attract the international community to its own side. On the other hand, a great or major power does not have the capabilities to compete with a super power in all sectors. When a major power is faced with the risk of opposing a super power, it has to observe carefully the proportion of its power utilization and its desires.

Regional powers retain limited capabilities influential in only a specific region and their potential is inadequate to participate in many global developments. Their position and requests are undermined in global calculations. In addition to Buzan’s classification, we may propose a new power status, ‘**sub-regional power**’, for the states with limited influence in their region. Buzan calls them domestic states (Buzan, Waever, 2003: 394). In this study, we also add the ‘**powerless power**’ category as a new layer of the power pyramid. Although powerless powers maintain some level of power capacity, they are unable to implement power policies due to international arrangements they are subject to, external pressures, and finally internal parameters manipulated by the foreign actors (Yılmaz, Haziran 2007: 67-104). Hegemonic concept of the 21<sup>st</sup> century

entails the eradication of national powers and their power utilization ability by influencing and controlling nation-states with internal and external nets.



**Figure 1: Power Pyramide in the 21 st Century** (Yılmaz, 2007: 16-17)

Power balance of 2+3 in Cold War period (USA-USSR + China-Japan-Germany) turned to the 1+4 with the dissolution of USSR in 1989 (Buzan, Waeber, 2003: 3). In the 2000s, America is solely at the top; China, EU Frontiers, Japan, and Russia follow it (Brzezinski, 2004: 279). In making an effort to define the Post- Cold War order, Charles Krauthammer pointed out the new system as ‘unipolar’ hegemony (Krauthammer, 1992: 295-306). In that order, the top power and the leader of the hegemony was the United States. As a new definition, ‘**asymmetric balance of power**’ is proposed by the American Institute, INSS. (INSS, 1997: i-xi). The study envisaged the USA as a unique super power at the top of the power pyramid. The Russian Federation, China, Japan, and EU are the major powers following USA. Under the major powers, countries like India and Brazil consist of another category in competition of becoming regional power. According to Nye, the lowest layer of power pyramide contains not only states but non-state actors like Al-Qaida that cause the chaotic security environment on the transnational level (Nye, 2004: 263).

#### **Power Centers and Security Zones:**

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, conditions of being global or regional power have been transformed in the following realms; control of money circulation, determination of international agenda, military posture in key regions, and being the centre of culture. In those terms, an actor ensuring those conditions more than others or having more coercive capacity to enforce its will on the others will declare its hegemony and become a global power center.

Some scholars say that a state should ensure the following conditions in order to become a power center (Denk, 1998: 24); (1) *Economical capacity influential globally.* (2) *Technological development particularly in energy and*

communication, (3) Money; globally valued and saved. (4) A strong Military with nuclear arms and 10 infantry divisions operational at overseas areas. (5) Geographically positioned with a crucial ally, main sea routes, drinkable water resources, energy sources, and defensive features. (6) Universally credited cultural values in national or religious dimensions attracting others to cooperate for common interests. (7) Diplomatic space (to have a powerful and harmonious state that designs and implements an imperialist policy).

**Table 3: Security Zones; Powers and Trends**

Security Zones	Sub-Security Zones	Superpower/ Major Powers	Regional Powers	Possible Trends
<b>Europe</b>	(1) Central Europe (2) Baltics (3) Eastern Europe (4) Balkans	* EU * USA * Russian Federation	* Ukraine	* In transformation process by EU and USA. * Possible intruder; Russia.
<b>CIS</b>	(1) Russia (2) Central Asia (3) Caucasus-Blacksea	* Russian Federation * USA-EU * China	* Iran	* China-Russia-Iran alliance with Japan may control the whole of Asia. * USA and EU effort to control the Caucasus and Ukraine.
<b>Eastern Asia</b>	(1) Northeastern Asia (2) Southeastern Asia	* China * USA * Japan	* Australia	* Status quo: USA-Japan cooperation against China. * Ongoing transformations may change the balances.
<b>Southern Asia</b>	-	* China * USA	* India	* Possibility to transform a supermixed region with the leadership of China. * USA effort to balance with India.
<b>Middle East</b>	(1) Magrip (2) Levant (3) Gulf and East	* USA * EU * China_Russia	* Iran * Israel	* In transformation process by USA. * Possible competitors; Russia and China.
<b>Africa</b>	(1) South Africa (2) Western Africa (3) Africa Horne	* EU * USA * China	-	* No regional power due to the weak state structures. * In transformation and exploitation process by Western Countries.
<b>Northern America</b>	-	* USA	-	NAFTA and Pan-American FTAA may be drivers to shape.
<b>Southern America</b>	(1) Southern Cone (2) Andean Countries	* USA	* Brazil * Argentina	* Brazil and Argentina may utilize Mercosour to increase influence. * Andean Countries may busy with drugs and internal instabilities.

Source: Table is self-consolidated mostly in accordance with the same explanations in Barry BUZAN and Ole WAEVER: *Regions and Powers*, (2003).

There are various efforts to classify power centers such as categorical (geopolitical, economical etc.) or geographical (global, continental). Geopolitical power centers are defined as; “States or group of states that are able to develop sources of power inside and outside their own geography, and influence those sources in their favour in comparison to other states” (Levent, 1997: 2). In this context, geopolitical power centers are classified as; (1) Global (USA), (2) Continental (China, Russian Federation), (3) Regional (India, Brazil, Iran, Japan), (4) Unified (NATO, Shangai Cooperation Organisation), (5) Limited (Canada, Mexico, Turkey, Israel, South Korea). EU, NAFTA, and APEC are listed within the economical power centers.

Security zones may have their own power centers and power balance that means a variation of polarity. For example, South Africa is unipolar; the Middle

East, South America, and Southeastern Asia are multipolar. Security zones are divided into two as Standard (with one or more regional powers) and One-centered regions. Table 3 points out the analysis of security zones in line with the power balances. Sometimes the unstructured security zones occur due to the insufficient regional powers, reluctance of external powers or rules of a powerful international arrangement blocking powers in the region.

### **Trends in Power Relations:**

It is a matter of studies mostly at actor level to predict how the international power relations will develop and how the track of power balance will change during the century. In this sense, these studies are seeking to figure out outcomes of the following trends: the possible future of the EU and the USA; how far an ascendant China might go as a competitor with the US; the new status of Russia in the multipolar world system; the increasingly independent security demand of Japan; and to what extent regional powers like India, Brazil and Iran will be recognized.

Table 4 prepared by Ronald L. Tammen and Jasek Kugler provides crucial clues about trends in world production. As realized in the table, China catches the USA making 30 % of world production in 2020. China and India both pass the USA in that term. Moreover, it is foreseen that the balance of power will shift from the Western Block (USA and EU) to the Far East (China and India). It is predicted that the ratio of the Western Block in world production is to decrease by 35 % while the Far East is to go up to 65 %.

**Tablo 4: World Production (%)**

<b>Nation/Year</b>	<b>1945</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2050</b>
USA	60	55	30	30	20
China	10	-	20	30	35
EU	20	30	40	25	15
India	8	8	8	20	30

*Source: Ronald L. TAMMEN, Jacek KUGLER, Douglas LEMKE, Allan C. STAM, Carole ALSHABARATI, Mark Andrew ABDOLLAHIAN, Brian EFIRD, and A. F. K. ORGANSKI: Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, Chatham House Press, (Chatham NJ, 2000).*

The USA is the unique super state able to make all types of interventions into all regions of the world. Unipolarity of the world system had two basic consequences; American hegemonic power became uncontrollable and unlimited and nation-states felt free to pursue the policies in favor of their own national interests (Bilbilik, 2003: 22). However, in a short time, it was understood that the nations were unable to implement national foreign policies outside the control of the USA. With this historical transformation of balance of power, the USA seized the historical opportunity of shaping the new world order according to its interests with no waste of time.

It is not certain that rising powers will become rivals for the USA. According to many studies, Europe, Japan, and Russia will have no great change in their powers in spite of the negative effects of their aging populations. As the closest competitor of the USA, the EU is rather far from being a super power in

the first quarter of this century due to shortages in military and political areas and other existing problems. It will thus take a long time for the EU to attain the level of political integration that will enable it to compete with the USA. As the old main powers of the European continent, England, Germany, and the France are fairly weak to catch up with the USA.

Among the nations that have a/the chance to make great progress, four nations are widely considered. These are China on the way to developing to become the largest country in industrial production; India in economic growth with the fantastic progress in the software technology; Russia and Brazil with great potential to catch with them (NIC, 2004: 51). Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and even Russia may support the increasing role of China and India.

## **POWER AND POLICY FOR THE NATION STATE**

### **Power and Policy:**

Policy is an art of state to prepare and utilize its power and resources in line with the national interests (Mütercimler, 1997: 38). A nation-state will become a major power only if it is able and willing to implement the power policy, come into terms with potential losses and by denying humiliation and ensuring respect about its policies. The gradual disappearance of national power policies is clear and crucial proof that the nation-state system is in a transition process. One of the basic factors for the regression of the nation-state is the rise of new actors replacing or limiting its sovereignty (De Rivero, 2003: 34-35). It is possible that various authority shifts may occur in reshaping power among the new actors. In that case, nation-states should determine how they will manage the process of the reshaping of power and how they will utilize the rest of their capacity in relation to international and regional missions. The fact that nation-states need to transform to some extent in the globalising world has become a source of insecurity and brought about the sense of losing control.

There is a direct relationship between the implementation of national security policies in a successful manner and national power and the utilization of that power effectively (Sarkesian, 1995: 25). Government, which represents the executive body of the political power, firstly detects the national interests and targets, and then determines the national policy relevant to them, finally utilizing the elements of national power to ensure national goals. Strategic success depends on the following conditions;

- Utilization of the power mixture in accordance with aim and time,
- Information capacity and intellectual accumulation,
- Development of tactics relevant to technical, economical, social, and cultural features,
- In addition to overt and well known methods, the application of covert, vague, and creative fighting methods (such as terror, propaganda, manipulation of mass media).

By closely monitoring ongoing and potential crises and new events, the nations are supposed to assess threats and risks to national security and interests in advance, and to take the necessary measures beforehand and to act using initiative

within the scope of national power instruments. Security concerns should be eliminated within the formations, law, and arrangements necessiated by the international environment in line with the international security approach. This dictates the need of security policy production taking national interests into consideration in order to develop the multinational cooperation, such as setting the contact groups, regional alliances, or strategic partnerships.

**Evolution of Power and New Categorization:**

Power in international relations is the influence a nation exerts on another in order to force that nation to do something that it does not do or does not want to do under normal conditions (Tezkan, 2005: 137). This power is the unique instrument of a state to implement a policy in international relations. National power is the fundamental source of national security policies and applications. (Bayat, 1982: VII). On the other hand, the target of the power policies is the structure of the selected nationstates and their national powers. Elements of national power are grouped under two headings; natural (geography, population, natural resources) and social (economic, military, politic, psycho-social, information) powers (Jablonsky, 1995: 130-137). However, in the 1990s, Joseph S. Nye’s classification of hard, economic, and soft power has been popular as a new approach in current arguments.

**Table 5: Power Categories According to Joseph S. Nye**

Power Types	Attitudes	Basic Instruments	Policies
<b>Hard Power</b>	* Coercion * Deterrence * Protection	* Threat * Force	* Coercive Diplomacy * War * Alliance
<b>Economical Power</b>	* Encouragement * Pressure	* Money Aid * Investment	* Economic support * Bribery
<b>Soft Power</b>	* Attraction * Making Agenda	* Values, Culture * Policies * Institutions	* Public Diplomacy * Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy

*Source: Joseph S. NYE: Yumuşak Güç (Soft Power), Çev.: Ri. Aydın, Elips Kitapları, (İstanbul, Ekim 2005), 37.*

Nye states that ‘hard power’ is the ability of coercion stemming from the national military and economical power. According to Nye, soft power is the capacity of attraction to ensure your will instead of coercion and money. Soft power derives from the attractiveness of a national culture and political ideas. You will not need to spend money for the ‘sticks and carrots’ to force the others into your way when they want what you want. If the other nations see your policy as legitimate, that means your soft power is high (Nye, 2004: 256).

As many scholars recognize, there is an essential optimal balance to be maintained between the hard and soft power. Overuse of hard power, like the USA has done recently, may kill the chance of soft power utilization. In other words, the more difficult a superior military force compels you to use hard power, the more difficult it will be to mobilize real social potential. The skill to unite hard and soft power is ‘smart power’(Nye, 2006). Results taken by using pressure and fear can not be permanent and they also legitimate acts of retribution. What’s more, the state using them in an area will not have the persuasive skills in order to

act softly in other areas because successful utilization of soft power requires consistency and conviction.

Developed countries use the technology, industrial goods, financial assets as instruments to convince other nations. In the present world, economy is the most important determinant for national power (Ulagay, 2006). Nations can become global and regional power only if they devise a reasonable strategy, develop human resources and a vigorous economy. Preconditions to do so are to have an image as unificator and mediator nation instead of outsider and aggressive one; to attract well educated people, technology and capital into the country. In addition to these, the size of a nation and its demographic potential are other factors to take into account.

### **Nation-State and Power Utilization:**

Hans Morgenthau, founder of Realism, suggests that nations might choose one of these three common policies in international policy (Morgenthau, 1970: 47); (1) Status quo policy, (2) Imperialism policy, and (3) Prestige policy. Other policy classification shows that there are two types of general policies to be implemented in international relations (Ari, 1997: 261-297); (1) Independent policy in the form of isolationism, neutrality, and nonalignment or (2) Coalitions and alliances. The most classic and popular power policy is the 'divide and rule' that envisages the division of the rivals or keeping them separated. Other policies aiming to change the power balance are listed as; (1) Grand acquisition, (2) Armament, and (3) Setting alliances. The types of policies above are still evolving within the context of the international system and in accordance with the new order.

The hegemon on the top of the power pyramid and the major powers in the next layer to the hegemon have developed various strategies depending on their geographies or power centers. Looking at historical examples, we may foresee the strategies of great powers may adopt in the international system as following (Posen & Ross, 1997: 5-53); (1) Isolationism (Intervention when events threaten own territory). (2) Balancing (Making efforts to change the power balance to prior position). (3) Selected conflict (Proactive intervention in case of a risk to change the power balance). (4) Maintaining supremacy (Keeping the hegemonic dominance in a unipolar order). (5) Imperialism (Retaining dominance through territory acquisition and control of the other nations in a unipolar order).

Security policies of the nation-state would be practised through national security strategies. National security strategies may be generalised as (Turgut, 2003: 41); (1) Deterrence, (2) Shaping the security environment, (3) Crisis management and out-of-war methods, (4) Limited power utilization, (5) Total war (conventional, nuclear or both). However the nation-state in the 21 st century is subject to vital security problems in terms of either domestic issues or implementing national power policies. The problems that stem from globalisation and post-modern ideas represented by the European Union might be summarised as (Yilmaz, 2006: 97);

- Increasing growth of international and transnational formations causes the erosion of national sovereignty and the increasing difficulty in implementing power policies to ensure national interests.

- Global economic integration restricts national supervision of economy and effectiveness of government, weakens the state.

- As economy appears as a driving force of national power, the determining role of international economic actors (multinational corporations, IMF, WB etc.) in the development of national economy makes economic security the most important parameter of national security.

- Transnational social and religious movements challenge national security.

- Global communication and transportation networks make the control of the national boundaries difficult.

- National unity is under the threat of demands for religious diversity and autonomy from the state. In short, the nation-states need to undergo reconstruction and reconsider their roles, and develop new methods and instruments for national security and power utilization.

**Table 6: Power and Policy in the 21 st Century**

POWER	POLICY	STRATEGY	ACTORS	CONCEPTS
<b>SOFT POWER</b> (Political, Cultural)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Diplomacy</li> <li>* Coercive Diplomacy</li> <li>* Cultural Programs</li> <li>* Making Agenda</li> <li>* Good Governance</li> <li>* Common Democracy</li> <li>* Open Society</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Shaping security environment</li> <li>* Regime restoration</li> <li>* Dialogue among the religions</li> <li>* Subversive activities</li> <li>* Propaganda &amp; Psychological war</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Governmental organisations</li> <li>* NGOs</li> <li>* Foundations</li> <li>* Civil Society Orgs</li> <li>* Media</li> <li>* Think-Tanks</li> <li>* Universities</li> <li>* Influence agents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Modernism</li> <li>* Democracy Projects</li> <li>* Dialogue Projects</li> <li>* GMEP</li> <li>* Human Rights</li> <li>* Post-Modernism</li> <li>* Minority Rights</li> </ul>
<b>ECONOMIC POWER</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Economic Aid Programs</li> <li>* Economic sanctions</li> <li>* Financial traps</li> <li>* Economic intelligence</li> <li>* Transparency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Foreign Aid</li> <li>* Privatization</li> <li>* Foreign Debt</li> <li>* Economic trigger</li> <li>* Stock exchange games</li> <li>* Economic covert ops</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* EU ECHO</li> <li>* MNCs</li> <li>* IMF, WB, WTO</li> <li>* UNDP</li> <li>* Financial Markets</li> <li>* International financiers</li> <li>* Illegal organisations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Liberalism</li> <li>* Free market</li> <li>* Development projects</li> <li>* Globalisation</li> <li>* Post-Modernism</li> <li>* Integration</li> <li>* Interdependency</li> <li>* Functioning Center</li> </ul>
<b>HARD POWER</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Total war</li> <li>* Limited War</li> <li>* Low intensity war</li> <li>* Guerilla war</li> <li>* Terrorism</li> <li>* War like operations</li> <li>* Out of war operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Military cooperation</li> <li>* Crisis management</li> <li>* Ethnic cleansing</li> <li>* Internal war</li> <li>* Rebellions</li> <li>* Occupation</li> <li>* Peace Keeping</li> <li>* Nation building</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Armed Forces</li> <li>* Special Forces</li> <li>* Paramilitary Elements</li> <li>* Private Military Companies</li> <li>* Guerilla Forces</li> <li>* Terrorist Organisations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* War on terror</li> <li>* WMD</li> <li>* Failed (Fragile) States</li> <li>* Preventive strike</li> <li>* Preventive engagement</li> <li>* Energy security</li> <li>* Civilian Control</li> </ul>

Source: Sait YILMAZ: *Power and Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, ALFA Publications, (Istanbul, 2008), p 121.

In the first quarter of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, nation-states are under the open or covert influence of many new methods, actors, and instruments either threatening national security or shaping the security environment in the implementation of internal and external policies. Those states will lose not only the status of developed nations and determinant role in world management but also their national sovereignty, due to their inability to compete with the current technological revolution and global economy. The nation-states must perceive the threats and their sources directed to them in order to make and implement right policies at national and international level; they must foresee the opportunities and



threats they face to make an accurate analysis and react with appropriate instruments.

### **A New Security Concept and Power Projection for Nation-State:**

In the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, all the nation-states except for the USA and major powers are subject to threats in two dimensions. Those nations will either be unable to execute the power policies by submitting to the pressures of hegemon and major powers or be added to the powerless power layer in the power pyramid. Only those nation-states able to independently implement power policies will be upgraded in the pyramid. However, in addition to the ability to act independently, they have to make immediate transformations in terms of either qualities of the nation-states or security approaches and power projections. We might envisage those transformations as explained in the paragraphs below;

(1) Common features of nation-states at risk of becoming a powerless power; foreign control of their internal and external security parameters and national sovereignty in the transnational structures and netting and inability to execute power policies in order to shape their own security environment. A unique way to overcome that risk is to have the relevant methods, actors, and instruments to struggle with the hegemon or opponents when the national interests are at stake. Aware of structural considerations, the political body should develop the conceptual and institutional infrastructure which will execute essential power elements, predominantly soft power, and methods. Putting aside the current security concept which is based on the national security index, reactive and dependent to the deterrence of hard power, nation-states need a new security mechanism '**national interest based**' with a '**sophisticated power projection**' harmonising the soft, economic and hard power elements together.

(2) The new security concept of the nation-states should focus on the transformations to protect the nation-state structure, national identity and unity. On the other hand, the nation-state should not only attach importance to interior policies but also determine the new roles relevant to its own geographical position in terms of national security. Instead of one dimensional and security focused policies, it should develop new conceptual approaches in order to make connections into the adjacent regions with specific strategies. The nation-state should develop common or independent doctrines and execution practices to cooperate with the hegemonic power instead of the role demanded by the hegemonic power. Increasing the scope of the foreign policy, it should build up a conceptual basis including economic and cultural codes and appropriate strategies focused on the regional projections.

(3) The promotion of nation-states is related to obtaining new missions in shaping their own geography and security environment by developing and harmonising the political, economic, and social actors. To this extent, it should strengthen institutional formations, staff, and capabilities in order to produce short, middle, and long term projections and alternative strategies. The 'warriors' of the new power policies will be the structural and institutional elements and processes that the state acts effectively with. These include civilian society organisations, NGOs, corporations, international organisations. A national system

should be set to combine the structural and institutional power elements in accordance with national interests.

(4) In order to benefit from the process of globalisation and resist its negative effects, the state tissues should be restored in accordance with the requirements to maintain national integrity, national identity, modernisation, supremacy of law, and traditional cultural values. In this respect, counter measures should be taken to eliminate the negative effects of external centers that target national security through subversive activities sourced and funded by foreigners, through using manipulated media, the business world, civil society, foundations, influence agents etc. Economical development should be in progress based on the optimum use of national resources reducing foreign dependency to a minimum level. The basis of national power must be a strong economy durable to foreign debt, economic sanctions, financial ploys. Last but not least, peripheral alliance and partnership processes should be established to neutralize external powers which are making efforts to shape neighbouring countries with policies and implications unappropriate for our national interests.

### **CONCLUSION:**

The phenomena of ‘globalisation’ and ‘interdependency’ of the post-modern paradigm have become apparent toward the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and paved the way for a new international system affecting methods and actors of US hegemony presented by Realism. In the post-cold war period, reconstruction process of the world is still in progress. A multipolar world order is in the making and the international environment has become more chaotic. In the first quarter of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the nation-states occupy regional or sub-regional power status in the middle layers of the global power pyramid and move down at increasing rates to the ‘poveless power’ status. The reason behind that movement is that hegemony implements concepts and power policies predominantly targetted to destroying the power utilization capacities of the nation-states.

Owing to regional conditions, pressures of power centers to the near geography, internal and external security concerns, nation-states have to make immediate and radical changes in their policy formation and implementation in terms of structural, methodical and political instruments. In that respect, the nation-states should develop a new security mechanism; proactive, national interest driven, and combining hard, economical, and soft power instruments instead of reactive in accordance with a national security based security concept. As well as strengthening the nation state formation and its structural power, it must also gain immunity against the effects of external powers. For this reason, the nation-states should restore their own structure on the basis of independent thinking and implementation. That is the precondition for the survival of a healthy world system and the existence of the nation-state in the history marathon.

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